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ARBITRATION POST-AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION AT THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION - A SERVICE PROVIDER’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Sandra K. Partridge* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
After the Supreme Court hands down an opinion about arbitration, scholars debate what it 
means to the law of arbitration and service providers decide how it will affect cases in practice.  
Some Court decisions change the manner and scope of the cases a provider may administer.  
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp.1 and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion2 
changed class action arbitration for ongoing and future cases.  
Class arbitration began in earnest as a result of the Court’s directive in 2003 in Greentree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle where the court allowed that an arbitration clause silent on the issue of 
class arbitration could be found by an arbitrator to permit class adjudication.3  Having selected 
arbitration rather than litigation, parties with small claims from the same contract were able to 
form putative classes and take steps to be certified and move their claims forward in arbitration.  
From this decision, arbitrators were viewed to have gained the authority to grant class status to 
groups of similarly situated Claimants4 and over the next eight years the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) saw 347 class arbitration cases filed under Class Arbitration Rules that 
were issued shortly after the Bazzle decision.  Special panels of arbitrators, a public class action 
docket, and a dedicated team of case managers came into being as the AAA sought to 
administrate these cases fairly and openly.  
A sea change to class arbitration arrived with Stolt-Nielsen’s pronouncement that the 
arbitrators in that case exceeded their powers when they certified a putative class without a basis 
in law or express contractual evidence of the parties’ desire to arbitrate as a class.5  Questions 
surfaced.  Was class arbitration dead?  As parties are unlikely to agree pre-dispute to a process 
that may apply to an unknown class for an unanticipated dispute, and even more unlikely to agree 
to class arbitration post-dispute, the Court appeared to raise significant questions about the 
viability of class arbitration.  And if there were no class arbitrations, did state court rulings that 
class action waivers in arbitration agreements were unconscionable mean parties were required to 
arbitrate as individuals or to litigate their claims?  Could the absence of arbitrators’ authority to 
permit a class action arbitration to proceed where the arbitration agreement is silent on the issue 
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1 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).  
2 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
3 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003). 
4 See id. 
5 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770.  
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mean that class arbitration cases would no longer be filed and the existing cases would be 
terminated? 
In 2011, the Court held that a class action waiver contained in an arbitration agreement 
could be enforced thereby negating California’s Discover Bank rule.6  In doing so, the Court 
directed the parties to arbitrate as individuals.  In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the Court 
referenced its prior holding in Stolt-Nielsen, stating: 
We then held that the agreement at issue, which was silent on the 
question of class procedures, could not be interpreted to allow them 
because the “changes brought about by the shift from bilateral 
arbitration to class-action arbitration” are “fundamental.”7 
Further, when addressing the public policy arguments that were asserted in favor of class 
actions the Court held “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even 
if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”8  Thus after Concepcion, arbitration clauses with class 
action waivers could be enforced despite the existence of states with common law that held to the 
contrary.  The AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocols9 continued to be a cornerstone for 
protecting the rights of consumers with new disputes arbitrating as individuals.  This paper looks 
at the AAA’s experience administrating class arbitrations from Bazzle to post-Concepcion from a 
service provider’s perspective. 
II.  BAZZLE ALLOWS CLASS ARBITRATION AND THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION RESPONDS  
When Greentree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle was decided in 2003, it was apparent that 
arbitration would be presented with novel questions regarding whether a class could be certified 
in arbitration and whether that question should be determined by the arbitrators.10  The American 
Arbitration Association recognized that its Commercial Rules then in effect, did not contain 
procedures that would adequately address the issues that Bazzle suggests should be decided by 
arbitrators; namely whether an arbitration clause permits class proceedings and if it does, what 
procedures should be followed for the resolution of the class’ claims.  Arbitration had been, up to 
that point, an event primarily between individual parties and several multi-parties.  Another 
consideration was the Class Arbitration Panel - what qualifications, experience and training 
should members of this panel possess?   
On October 8, 2003, the American Arbitration Association developed its Supplementary 
Rules for Class Arbitration11 and selected a national panel to hear cases under the new 
                                                     
6 See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
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8 See id. at 1753. 
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Supplementary Rules in combination with the underlying AAA Rules.  The Supplementary Rules 
“shall apply to any dispute arising out of an agreement that provides for arbitration pursuant to 
any of the rules of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) where a party submits a 
dispute to arbitration on behalf of or against a class or purported class.”  In the Supplementary 
Rules, arbitrators first review the arbitration clause and then issue a partial final award 
determining whether the clause can permit class action arbitration.  In the next phase, using the 
standards generally provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, arbitrators decide whether 
the class can be certified and issue a reasoned partial award.  If the determination is that the class 
should be certified, the arbitrators will then hear the merits of the case and issue a final award.  
The Supplementary Rules provide that “at least one of the arbitrators shall be appointed from the 
AAA’s national roster of class arbitration arbitrators.”12 
A set of minimum qualifications was developed for the AAA Class Arbitration Panel that 
includes: extensive class action experience - specifically where an individual has experience such 
that a substantial portion of her practice is devoted to litigating class action matters in arbitration 
or in other dispute resolution forums; experience with a broad range of practice areas and has 
knowledge of recent class action court decisions; experience with class action litigation as a state 
or federal judge; and extensive experience in conflict management and leadership role(s) in legal 
professional association(s). 
In order to ensure class action arbitration would be a public and transparent process, and 
in an effort to protect absent class members, the AAA created a publicly available online docket 
of all class arbitrations.  This searchable online docket allows users to track cases through each 
stage of the AAA Class Arbitration process, from the Clause Construction process through the 
final award.13  The names of the Claimants and their counsel as well as Respondent and their 
counsel are shown on the title page of the case.  Also on this page is the disposition of the case 
and links to any activity including hearings, partial final awards, and dismissals.  Additionally, 
the AAA posted a policy statement concerning the class arbitrations: 
Accordingly, the American Arbitration Association will 
administer demands for class arbitration pursuant to its Supplementary 
Rules for Class Arbitrations if (1) the underlying agreement specifies 
that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall be resolved by 
arbitration in accordance with any of the Association's rules, and (2) the 
agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder 
of claims.  
The Association is not currently accepting for administration 
demands for class arbitration where the underlying agreement prohibits 
class claims, consolidation or joinder, unless an order of a court directs 
the parties to the underlying dispute to submit any aspect of their 
dispute involving class claims, consolidation, joinder or the 
enforceability of such provisions, to an arbitrator or to the 
Association.14  
                                                     
12 Id. 
13 See Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/disputeresolutionservices/casedocket (last visited May 22, 2012). 
14 AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003840 
(last visited May 22, 2012). 
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III.  AAA’S CLASS ARBITRATION DOCKET 
Examination of the AAA’s Class Arbitration Docket reveals the activity of the 347 class 
arbitrations filed with the AAA since the Bazzle decision in 2003.  As of December 6, 2011, most 
of these cases had been closed (248) with the remaining cases ongoing (98).  Upon filing, the 
cases were classified by the AAA as Commercial (182), Employment (133), and Construction 
(32) and a special team of case managers began administrating the cases.  After their selection, 
the arbitrators conducted the Clause Construction phase to determine whether the arbitration 
clause permitted arbitration under the Class Arbitration Supplementary Rules.  
Nearly half of these cases (170) resulted in clause construction awards or stipulations; the 
majority of these awards (110) interpreted the arbitration clause to permit class arbitration while 
nineteen awards found the clause did not permit class arbitration.  In an additional forty-one 
stipulations parties affirmatively agreed that the arbitration could proceed on a class-wide basis.  
Claims in fifty-six cases out of the 151 cases that could move forward were still at issue after the 
Clause Construction phase.  
Settlements were reached in 131 cases; thirteen settled with consent awards and 118 
settled without consent awards.  The arbitrators certified slightly more than half the cases that 
proceeded to the Class Certification phase (29) and denied certification to the remaining classes 
(22) with an additional five cases reaching class certification by stipulation between the parties.  
IV.  STOLT-NIELSEN:   THE EFFECT ON AAA’S CLASS ACTIONS 
The Stolt-Nielsen decision created uncertainty in the class arbitrations being administered 
by the AAA at the time and an expected paucity of future filings.  Arbitrators in the midst of the 
Clause Construction phase in particular were faced with new law mid-case.  Arbitrators 
approached this new set of circumstances by allowing parties to bring forward arguments 
reflecting Stolt-Nielsen.  Respondents in some ongoing cases successfully argued the Court’s 
ruling in opposing a class process in Clause Construction and Class Certification phases.   
In fact, the filing of class arbitrations did not cease post-Stolt-Nielsen as parties filed 
fifty-three class arbitration cases with AAA after the Court’s decision.  Because parties may still 
file demands for class arbitration under AAA’s Class Arbitration Rules, Claimants have 
continued to seek class arbitration, often arguing to distinguish their case from that of Stolt-
Nielsen.  These arguments are based in limitations of the applicability of Stolt-Nielsen because 
the case was a business-to-business dispute rather than the present consumer or employee case.  
Or, parties argued that while the outcome was based on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),15 
there were state contract law principles that would permit class arbitration.  Or, parties cited a 
unique fact that existed in Stolt-Nielsen in that the parties stipulated that the arbitration clause was 
silent concerning class action: 
                                                     
15 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
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But the panel had no occasion to "ascertain the parties' 
intention" in the present case because the parties were in complete 
agreement regarding their intent.  In the very next sentence after the 
one quoted above, the panel acknowledged that the parties in this case 
agreed that the Vegoilvoy charter party was "silent on whether [it] 
permit[ted] or preclude[d] class arbitration," but that the charter party 
was "not ambiguous so as to call for parol evidence."  Ibid.  This 
stipulation left no room for an inquiry regarding the parties' intent, and 
any inquiry into that settled question would have been outside the 
panel's assigned task.16 
V.  POST-CONCEPCION:  WHERE WE ARE NOW AT AAA 
After Concepcion, the class arbitration landscape was changed further by the Court’s 
explanation of its ruling in Stolt-Nielsen as well as its holding concerning class action waivers.  
While Stolt-Nielsen addressed whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits class action 
proceedings where the contract did not expressly allow them, Concepcion decided whether the 
FAA requires the enforcement of an explicit class action waiver in light of state law that would 
hold to the contrary: 
Although we have had little occasion to examine classwide 
arbitration, our decision in Stolt-Nielsen is instructive.  In that case we 
held that an arbitration panel exceeded its power under §10(a)(4) of the 
FAA by imposing class procedures based on policy judgments rather 
than the arbitration agreement itself or some background principle of 
contract law that would affect its interpretation.17 
As an alternative to filing a class action demand, members of the would-be class may 
instead file as individuals under AAA’s Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related 
Disputes18 based on AAA’s Consumer Due Process Protocols.19  This Protocol guarantees due 
process by assuring the right to representation, forbidding businesses from requiring an 
inconvenient forum, and cost-shifting from consumers to businesses.  And, the Protocols require 
there be no limitations on damages, a neutral decision maker, and access to small claims court 
should a consumer prefer that forum.20 
The cost-shifting is arguably one of the most important guarantees of due process and 
access to justice for these claimants.  Consumers with claims of $10,000 or less pay one-half the 
arbitrators compensation but no more than a maximum of $125, and for claims of more than 
                                                     
16 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 (2010).  
17 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). 
18 See Consumer-Related Disputes Supplementary Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/sitesearch/sitesearchdetail?doc=ADRSTG_015806&_afrLoop=422949359255662&_afr
WindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=y4z8872x1_382#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3Dy4z8872x1_382%26_afrLoop%3D42
2949359255662%26doc%3DADRSTG_015806%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dy4z8872x1_446 
(last visited May 22, 2012). 
19 See Consumer Due Process Protocol, principle 3.2 (1998), AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 (last visited May 22, 2012).  
20 See id. at principle 4-5, 14. 
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$10,000 but less than $75,000, consumers pay a maximum of $375.21  All other arbitration fees 
and arbitrator compensation are paid by businesses; compliance is ensured by a requirement that 
AAA receive, review, and approve the arbitration clauses of these contracts prior to their use and 
a further requirement that the clauses maintain their compliance with the due process protocols.  
Cases arising out of contracts with clauses not in compliance are refused administration by the 
AAA. 
The AAA also makes data concerning the consumer cases it administrates available on its 
website as a quarterly report indicating participants, claims activity, and costs of the individual 
arbitrations.  The current file posted on AAA’s website,22 shows data from the third quarter of 
2011 and contains 64,471 records from 61,843 cases.  
Northwestern University Law School’s Searle Civil Justice Institute Task Force on 
Consumer Arbitration conducted a study of AAA consumer cases in 2009 and concluded in 
summary: 
• Consumers won some relief in 53.3% of the cases they filed and recovered an 
average of $19,255; business claimants won some relief in 83.6% of their cases 
and recovered an average of $20,648.  
 
• No statistically significant repeat-player effect was identified using a traditional 
definition of repeat-player business.23   
 
The Report also discussed the important issue of costs and access for consumers involved 
in individual arbitrations with businesses, in the case of AAA arbitrations where consumers filed 
demands against businesses. 
The upfront cost of arbitration for consumer claimants in cases 
administered by the AAA appears to be quite low.  
 
In cases with claims seeking less than $10,000, consumer 
claimants paid an average of $96 ($1 administrative fees + $95 
arbitrator fees).  This amount increases to $219 ($15 administrative fees 
+ $204 arbitrator fees) for claims between $10,000 and $75,000.  These 
amounts fall below levels specified in the AAA fee schedule for low-
cost arbitrations, and are a result of arbitrators reallocating consumer 
costs to businesses.  
 
AAA consumer arbitration seems to be an expeditious way to 
resolve disputes.24  
While businesses may be increasingly drawn to arbitration in the consumer area as a 
result of Concepcion, these businesses must ensure their compliance with the AAA’s Due Process 
                                                     
21 See Consumer Arbitration Costs, Administrative Fee Waivers, and Pro Bono Arbitrators, AM. ARB. ASS’N, 
http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer (follow “Consumer Arbitration Costs, Administrative Fee Waivers, and 
Pro Bono Arbitrators” hyperlink). 
22 See Consumer Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer (follow “Consumer 
Arbitration Statistics” hyperlink). 
23 See SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
ASSOCIATION-PRELIMINARY REPORT, at xiii (Mar. 2009). 
24 Id.  
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protocols for consumer and employment disputes.  The Searle study found that in practice, 
consumers participating in AAA arbitrations under the Consumer Due Process Supplement 
actually paid less than the fees specified in the AAA Rules.25 
Under AAA’s Rules, consumers may also choose not to arbitrate post-dispute and instead 
select the option of filing in small claims court for claims up to the jurisdictional limits of the 
court.  The AAA Commercial Rules provide a carve-out for consumer-related disputes whether 
filed by the consumer or the business.26  In California the small claims court’s limit of $7,500 per 
claim and a general rule requiring self-representation can make this an attractive option for 
consumers, especially with the free small claims advisor service the state provides to explain 
court and enforcement procedures, help with claim or defense preparation, work out payment 
plans, and answer other questions.27    
VI.  THE RESPONSE TO CONCEPCION 
 One salient factor of Concepcion is the provision in the arbitration clause for cases 
where Claimants recover more from the arbitrator than the last, best offer from AT&T.  A self-
imposed penalty of $10,000 and payment of attorney’s fees provides Claimants with small claims 
with a sizeable potential recovery for the small claim sizes that are customary in class litigation 
and arbitration.  In the Court’s view, these two factors demonstrate the likelihood a dispute will 
be resolved without the necessity of the Claimants banding together as class actions.  The Court 
notes: 
“Indeed, the District Court concluded that the Concepcions 
were better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they 
would have been as participants in a class action, which “could take 
months, if not years, and which may merely yield an opportunity to 
submit a claim for recovery of a small percentage of a few dollars.” 
Laster, 2008 WL 5216255, at *12.28 
Since Concepcion allowed AT&T’s class action waiver to stand, certain law firms filed 
hundreds of individual arbitrations against AT&T aimed at stopping the company’s bid to merge 
with a competing wireless provider and AT&T responded by filing suit in the Southern District of 
New York29 seeking to stop them from filing many individual arbitration demands with AAA, 
one of which is “388 paragraphs in length and contains 641 footnotes.”30  AT&T argued these 
claims should not be decided in arbitration because they were brought under the Clayton Act.31  
The company cited its clause’s provision that consumers were allowed to bring claims only in an 
“individual capacity” and not as a “class member in any purported class or representative 
proceeding”32 and noted that a Florida court granted AT&T Mobility a preliminary injunction in a 
                                                     
25 See id. 
26 See Rule R-1, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N (June 1, 2010). 
27 See CAL. DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT: A GUIDE TO ITS PRACTICAL USE 4-7, 
available at http://www.dca.ca.gov/publications/small_claims/small_claims.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
28 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
29 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Gonnello, 11 Civ. 5636, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116420, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 
2011).                                                                                                                                   
30 Id. at *2. 
31 See id. at *6. 
32 Id.  
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similar case finding “the customers' arbitration demands ‘bear the hallmarks of a class action.’”33  
The Southern District of New York court added “the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a 
clause both requiring that arbitration proceed on an individualized basis and prohibiting any form 
of class or representative action.”34 
In the end, the court in Gonello ruled that the attempt to stop the merger was outside the 
scope of the arbitration clause because “the parties withheld from the arbitrator the power to 
decide questions that would necessarily affect the rights of more than the parties to the dispute 
through the grant of declaratory or injunctive relief.”35  Nonetheless, AT&T found itself arguing 
the other side of arbitrability from its position in Concepcion.  
VII.  SUMMARY 
In summary, while the Court’s decisions in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion appeared to 
some to be a death knell for class arbitration, in practice there seems to be life for parties seeking 
a class arbitration dispute resolution process and for lawyers representing large numbers of 
consumers seeking redress for claims against businesses by bringing forward many individual 
small claims that businesses are required to pay for under the American Arbitration Association’s 
Consumer Due Process Protocols. 
                                                     
33 Id. at *8 n.1.  
34 Id. 
35 Gonnello, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116420, at *4. 
 
 
